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The need to formally verify hardware and software systems before they are deployed the real world 
has been recognized for several decades now. This is especially true of concurrent systems that are 
even more difficult to debug than sequential systems. For example, many of the protocols that get 
employed in real-life systems often look deceptively simple at first glance, and yet often contain 
hidden errors. In many cases, these errors cannot be revealed through simulation alone. Tools 
that are powerful enough to verify real-life systems of significant sizes have, however, only recently 
become available, thanks to developments such as efficient Boolean reasoning methods. As a result, 
there is a real opportunity amongst practitioners of formal methods to apply these tools to real-life 
examples and to teach tomorrow’s designers— today’s students— the use of these tools for solving 
practically significant problems. This paper is about our efforts in this regard.
Among formal verification tools that can verify concurrent systems, model checking tools have 
become quite popular. There are several reasons for this. First, their ability to carry out proofs 
with relatively very little human intervention makes it possible for designers to automatically carry 
out many of the proofs, thus freeing them up for more creative tasks. Second, most concurrent 
hardware and software systems are one-ofs, and hence it is very difficult to recoup human effort 
put into one project for use in another.
In this paper, we report on our experience in using SM V  [1], a symbolic model checker, in 
a graduate class on Program Verification, on practical problems of significant sizes. SM V  has 
previously been extensively used by several researchers [1, 2] in verifying non-trivial hardware and 
software systems. In this paper we present the following case studies: (i) verification of a distributed 
shared memory protocol [3] that is widely known; (ii) verification of a new crossbar arbiter that 
the first author’s group has developed. We also discuss the problems encountered while tackling 
these examples using SM V, and suggest possible solutions. We divide this discussion into three 
sections: (i) aspects related to the expressive power of the C TL  formalism; (ii) aspects related 
to state explosion; and (iii) aspects related to the particular implementation of SM V. The main 
contribution of this paper is that it provides detailed verification case studies on problems of great 
interest to designers of distributed protocols as well as designers of asynchronous circuits that might 
be used in realizing these protocols.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the verification of 
the centralized version of the distributed shared memory (DSM) protocol [3]. Section 3 presents 
the verification of a distributed version of the same protocol. This widely used protocol implements 
a demand-paged virtual memory system across a collection of computing nodes (Figure 1). Both 
the centralized and the distributed D S M  protocols described in this paper are widely referred to,
Figure 1: Abstraction of distributed shared memory provided by computing nodes
and form the basis of several new protocols of a similar nature, for example [4, 5]. Descriptions of 
these protocols were taken verbatim, in the form of pseudo-code, from [3], and encoded in SMV. 
Admittedly this is a less than perfect process, because pseudo-code descriptions can be ambiguous 
and therefore can be mis-interpreted. However, pseudo-code descriptions form the link between the 
designers’ thoughts and the final implementation; hence, it is of considerable practical importance to 
scrutinize the purported algorithm while it is at a pseudo-code level, for this offers the opportunity 
to detect errors sufficiently early, and helps in resolving ambiguities, if any. Also, we do not have 
access to the final implementation of the algorithms of [3]; therefore, remarks regarding correctness 
made in this paper apply only to the pseudo-code.
In Section 4, we present the verification of a symmetric crossbar arbiter—an asynchronous 
arbiter described in [6]. This example provides useful insight into asynchronous circuit verification 
using SMV. We provide concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Shared Virtual Memory: Centralized Manager
Consider a collection of computer nodes, each supporting one or more processes. Suppose each of 
these processes wants to view the aggregate of the memory available on all the computer nodes as 
one homogeneous shared memory. This view can be supported by treating the memory available 
at each node as a cache, and providing mechanisms for demand-paging across the computer nodes. 
Any scheme of this nature has to maintain the coherence of the individual memory units with 
respect to the logical abstraction of a shared memory.
In the centralized algorithm, one of the nodes is selected as the manager node. The manager 
node has an information-table with each entry in it corresponding to a page. More specifically, an 
information-table entry for a page consists of the owner of the page (the node that last wrote into 
the page), the copyset of the page (i.e., which nodes have the page available for use in the read 
mode), and a lock (semaphore) to give the manager exclusive access to the information-table entry. 
In addition, every node (including the manager) maintains a page table that has, for each entry 
corresponding to a page, information on the page access mode and a lock to provide exclusive access 
to a page table entry. Every node has a read-fault handler and a write-fault handler to handle local 
read/write-faults. Each node also has a read server, a write server, and an invalidate server. These 
servers handle remote requests as elaborated in Section 2.2.
2.1 Overview of the Results
Our main result concerning the verification of the centralized protocol is summarized before we 
go into the details. The pseudo-code appearing in [3] is scanty in detail about certain boundary 
cases. If special care is not taken in modeling these boundary cases, deadlocks will result. We were 
satisfied that this observation was confirmed by SMV, as detailed in Section 2. However, to our 
pleasant surprise, we could also spot another deadlock that was more subtle and was previously 
unknown to us. This experience clearly demonstrates SMV’s ability to detect errors in pseudo-code
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statements of non-trivial algorithms.
2.2 Details of the Centralized DSM  Protocol
We now present the algorithms used by the various fault handlers and servers.
2.2.1 Read-fault Handler
Upon encountering a read-fault, the read-fault handler (RFH)
RFH1: locks the page-table entry corresponding to the faulted page; ^
RFH2: asks the manager for the page in read mode;
RFH3: upon receipt of the page, sends confirmation to the manager;
RFH4: sets the local page-table entry access mode to read; .
RFH5: unlocks the page-table entry.
2.2.2 Write-fault Handler
Upon encountering a write-fault, the write-fault handler (WFH)
WFH1: locks the page-table entry corresponding to the faulted page;
WFH2: asks the manager for the page in write mode;
WFH3: upon receipt of the page, sends confirmation to the manager;
WFH4: sets the local page-table entry access mode to write;
WFH5: unlocks the page-table entry.
2.2.3 Read Server Running on the Manager Node
Upon encountering an external read request, the manager read server (MRS)
MRS1: locks the information-table entry for the page in question;
MRS2: includes the requester in the copyset;
MRS3: asks the node that owns the page being requested to send a copy directly to the requester; 
MRS4: waits for confirmation from the requester;
MRS5: unlocks the information-table entry.
2.2.4 Write Server Running on the Manager Node
Upon encountering an external read request, the manager write server (MWS)
MWS1: locks the information-table entry for the page in question;
MWS2: for each node in the copyset of the page in question, invokes its invalidate server (only 
the requester node can hold a page in the write mode - all the copies of this page must be 
invalidated);
MWS3: assigns the copyset to the empty set;
MWS4: asks the owner node to send a copy of the page directly to the requester;
MWS5: waits for confirmation from the requester;
MWS6: marks the requester as the new owner in the information-table entry for this page; 
MWS7: unlocks the information-table entry.
2.2.5 Read Server at the Owner Node
Upon encountering a read request, the owner read server (ORS)
ORSl: locks the page-table entry;
ORS2: sets the access mode of the page to read, in the page-table entry (so if the owner had write 
access before, it relinquishes this privilege);
ORS3: sends copy of the page to the requester;
ORS4: unlocks the page-table entry.
2.2.6 Write Server at the Owner Node *
Upon encountering a write request, the owner write server (OWS)
OWS1: locks the page-table entry;
OWS2: sets the access mode to invalid;
OWS3: sets a copy of the page to the requester;
OWS4: unlocks the page-table entry.
2.2.7 Invalidate Server (anywhere)
An invalidate server at any node merely sets the access mode of the page to invalid. It does not 
lock the page-table entry, as setting the invalidation bit is an atomic step.
2.3 Discussions
State-explosion is a constant threat while using a symbolic model-checker for significantly sized 
problems. It is almost always necessary to take advantage of the symmetries in the problem, 
thereby minimizing the number of different situations modeled. For example, without any loss of 
generality, we can model a version of the protocol using only one page. As far as the number of 
nodes go, a minimum of three was felt necessary (to model the owner node, the manager node, 
and the requesting node as three separate entities). However, state explosion prevented us from 
doing this, and we could model only a maximum of two nodes, despite considerable efforts put into 
variable orderings. We feel that the practical applicability of SMV can be greatly enhanced if the 
system offers users with sufficient insight into the problem being modeled, what might be causing 
the state explosion, and also help him/her determine a suitable variable ordering. Work done in
[1] and [7] relating to the complexity characteristics of BDDs should help in this regard.
2.3.1 The First Deadlock
The first deadlock situation detected by SMV is the following. Consider two nodes, 0 and 1, with 
node 1 owning the only page in the system in the read mode. (This can happen immediately after 
the following sequence: node 1 wrote into the page; node 0 had a read-fault into the page; therefore 
node 1 reverted back to the read mode, but still remaining the owner.) Now suppose node 1 has a 
write-fault for the page. Hence, the fault handler locks the page table entry at node 1 for the page 
(state WFH1). A request then goes to the manager write server for the page. The manager locks 
the information-table entry (MWSl). Since node 1 is the owner, the manager requests the owner 
to send page to itself (!). Node l ’s read server tries to lock its page table entry (ORSl) which node
1 has already locked at WFHl! This is a direct deadlock (see Figure 2(a) which shows the cycle in 
the resource dependency graph.) The problem arose because the pseudo-code did not first check
(a) Deadlock 1
(b) Deadlock 2
whether node 1 was the owner—if it did, it could have avoided going to the centralized manager! 
Pseudo-code routines typically leave out detail such as this.
This deadlock was known to us even before we embarked on verification. As this example shows, 
considerable caution has to be exercised in translating pseudo-code into actual code. Therefore, it 
was satisfying that SMV could detect this deadlock.
2.3.2 The Second Deadlock
The second deadlock is more subtle in nature, and its existence was previously unknown to us. The 
scenario is as follows. Node 1 owns the page in the read mode and has a write-fault for the page. 
The write-fault handler of node 1 locks the page table entry for the page (WFH1).
Meanwhile node 0 has a read-fault and its request goes to the manager. The manager locks its 
information-table entry (MRSl) and requests the owner’s read server (i.e., node l ’s read server) to 
send the page directly to node 0 which is the requester. Node l ’s read server now tries to lock the 
page table entry (ORS1), but hangs as node 1 has already locked this entry at WFH1.
Node l ’s fault handler is meanwhile not blocked. It sends a request to the manager to have the 
page’s access mode converted from read to write. The manager tries to lock its information-table 
entry (MWS1) which has already been locked at MRSl. At this stage there is a deadlock! (See 
Figure 2(b) which shows the cycle in the resource dependency graph.)
The solution is to prevent the race between node l ’s write-fault handler’s actions and node 0’s 
read-fault handler’s actions. Several solutions are possible and we have not pursued any particular 
solution, as that was not the purpose of our exercise.
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3 Shared Virtual Memory: Distributed Manager
The verification of the dynamic distributed manager (DDM) algorithm proposed in [3] is detailed 
in this section. In the DDM, there is no centralized manager. Every node has sufficient information 
to locate the required page. The nodes use message passing mechanism to communicate with each 
other. A page has three modes associated with it: invalid, read, and write. A processor not having 
a local copy of the page has it mapped invalid. A page can be shared by several processors in read 
mode, while a page can reside in write mode only at one node. All processors sharing a page must 
invalidate it when one node wants to write into the page.
Each node maintains a probable owner for each page it has a copy of. The probable owner is 
that processor which this node “thinks” to be the actual owner of the page. It may be the case 
that the probable owner may not be the actual owner; in case it isn’t, the probable owner will have 
its own probable owner for that page. The algorithm guarantees that a message forwarded along 
such a “probable owner chain” will finally reach the actual owner of that page, thereby ensuring 
that the page will be located.
3.1 Overview of the Results
In our SMV descriptions, we could model two processors. Modeling three processes would have 
covered most situations (we think three processes are sufficient, but do not have a proof for this). 
For certain queries, we could model the behavior of three processes, however only after manually 
eliminating many of the capabilities of the processes. This approach of specializing the process 
descriptions in response to the queries being handled is error-prone. We eagerly await more powerful 
versions of SMV that have the ability to handle much more state and/or offer insight into where 
state explosion is happening. Modulo these limitations, however, we could establish a large number 
of interesting properties with success. One fairly obvious deadlock (that can be blamed on the 
abstractness of the pseudo-code) was also detected.
3.2 Details of the Distributed DSM  Protocol
Details of the DDM protocol are now provided for each of the operations supported. Upon read 
hit, the state of the page does not change. Upon write hit, the access type of the page is changed 
to write.
3.2.1 Read-fault Handler
Upon encountering a read-fault, the node
RFH1: asks the probable owner of the page to give read access to the page;
RFH2: when the page arrives, it sets the probable owner for that page to itself, and changes the 
page access type to read.
3.2.2 W rite-fault Handler
Upon encountering a write-fault, the node
WFH1: asks the probable owner to give write access to the page;
WFH2: sends an invalidation message for the page to the copyset of the page;
WFH3: sets its probable owner field to point to itself;
WFH4: when the page arrives, it sets the access mode of the page to write.
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3.2.3 Read Server at the Owner N ode
Upon encountering a read request, the owner read server (ORS)
ORS1: if it is the owner of the page, then
ORS la: adds self to the copyset of the page;
ORSlb: changes the access-type of the page to read;
ORSlc: sends the page and its copyset to the requester;
ORSld: in the local page table, records that the probable owner of the page is the requestor, 
else '
ORS2a: forwards the request to the probable owner of the page;
ORS2b: sets the probable owner to be the requestor. .
3.2.4 W rite Server at the Owner N ode
Upon encountering a write request, the owner write server (OWS)
OWS1: If it is the owner, then
OWSla: sets the access mode of the page to invalid;
OWSlb: sends the page and the copyset of the page to the requestor;
OWSlc: in the local page-table, sets the probable owner of the page to the requestor.
else
OWS2a: forwards the request to the probable owner;
OWS2b: sets the probable owner to the requester.
3.2.5 Invalidate Server (anywhere)
For each invalidation request,
IS1: sets the access mode to invalid;
IS2: sets the probable owner field to the requestor.
The processes in SMV are modeled as follows. Each node in the DSM system is a process at 
the top level in SMV. This process also acts like a read/write fault handler. Each process has as 
its sub-process the read/write server and invalidate server.
The communication between the processors was modeled in SMV using globally shared vari­
ables as well as more modular constructs that simulate message passing. Modeling all the process 
interactions without using shared variables would have resulted in SMV code that more closely 
resembles the pseudo-code. This direction was abandoned as it resulted in state explosion.
3.3 D iscussions
Using SMV, the following properties were established of the specification of the DDM algorithm:
• “Suppose processor P3 does not have the page, wants read access to the page, and thinks 
that probable owner is PI. Suppose processor PI is not the owner and thinks that P2 is the 
probable owner; suppose P2 is the actual owner. Then the the message from P3 to PI will 
be forwarded to P2, which will then grant read access to P3.”
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Figure 3: A Symmetry/Crossbar Arbiter Design
• “If the processor wants to write into the j^ Cge which it does not currently have, it will eventu­
ally have access to the page in the write mode.” Similarly the read access was also successfully 
validated.
• “A page can be shared by two processors in the read mode.”
• “If a page is in the write mode at some node, it cannot reside in either the read or the write 
modes in any other processor.”
• “A page has to reside somewhere; it cannot be invalid in all the processors.”
• “If a page is being shared by the two processors in the read mode and one of them wants to 
write into the page, then it will get the page in the write mode, while the other node has to 
invalidate its copy of the page.”
The following error (attributable to the abstract nature of the pseudo-code) was detected. 
Suppose a node N that owns a page has it in read mode and wants to write into it. The resulting 
write fault will cause the write fault handler on node N to lock the page table entry and send a 
message to the probable owner. The message will traverse the probable owner chain (whose length 
can be zero or more) and eventually arrive back at node N. The write server on node N tries to 
lock the page table entry, but will hang as it has already been locked by the write fault handler. 
Again the error is due to the pseudo-code not being very specific about boundary conditions.
It is, however, very easy to ignore these boundary conditions and proceed with the coding of 
the algorithm, thereby making such errors even more hard to detect. The use of model checking 
tools such as SMV early in the design process can prevent this from happening.
4 Hardware Verification: Verification of a Crossbar Arbiter
A symmetric crossbar arbiter [8] arbitrates requests for connections to be made on an N  X N  
crossbar switch. Assume that at any particular instant of time, a subset the N 2 switches can be
requested to be closed. In response to any such request, the arbiter must grant the maximum 
possible number of requests (at most N ) that do not conflict on any row or column (i.e., that 
do not share any row- or column-wire of the crossbar). In [6], we have developed a family of 
arbiters that meet the above specifications. As opposed to the circuits used by [8], our circuits 
are all asynchronous in nature. Furthermore, they are based on a new asynchronous component 
developed by the first author called the lockable C-element [9]. We illustrate our verification efforts 
on one of these circuits given in Figure 3, called the wavefront arbiter.
The operation of the wavefront arbiter is as follows. Each element shown in the figure is a 
lockable C-element— or, LockC for short. A LockC behaves similar to a Muller C-element, except 
it has an extra input called lock and an extra output called lack (not shown in the diagram to 
avoid clutter—we also avoid showing some of the logic associated with each LockC, again to avoid 
clutter).
When no external requests are present, all the lock inputs are kept deasserted. As a result, any 
LockC can fire whenever it is enabled. Under these circumstances, the circuit shown in Figure 3, 
propagates diagonal wavefronts that propagate from the top-left corner towards the bottom-right 
corner. More precisely the array will always (except during a brief moment) have two diagonal 
wavefronts flowing through it from the top-left corner towards the bottom-right corner. Further­
more, these two diagonals will always be the closest two such diagonals that do not have any 
row-wire or column-wire in common. (This spacing is achieved by the wrapped torus connection 
to the resetting input of the LockC elements.)
One snapshot of these two diagonals is shown in Figure 3. We connect the two diagonals with a 
curved line to signify that these two diagonals are “connected” : when one diagonal moves forwards, 
so does the other. For example, the position of the diagonals shown in the figure is 01, 10, 32, and 
23; the next position of the diagonals will be 02, 11, 20, and 33; after that the diagonals will be at
03, 12, 21, 30 (at this time there will be only one diagonal); the next diagonal will then manifest 
at 00 and 31, 22, 13.
Suppose station i , j  wants to close the crossbar switch i , j .  It requests permission by applying 
a lock input to LockC i , j .  If a wavefront is passing through LockC i , j  or is just about to do 
so, the effect of the lock input is non-deterministic: the wavefront may either be pinned down at 
location i , j ,  or it may be allowed to slip through. (Whatever be the outcome, the decision is crisp, 
without metastability.) If the wavefront slips through, then the request at i , j  has to be held till the 
wavefront comes to i , j  once again. In this case, the wavefront is sure to be pinned down because 
the lock was applied much earlier with respect to this arrival of the wavefront.
When a wavefront is finally pinned down at location i, j ,  a lack output is produced (with the 
help of a few logic gates which are not shown). The lack signal can be taken as permission to close 
switch i , j .  After the use of switch i , j  is over, lock is deasserted, whereupon lack is deasserted, 
and the wavefront that is pinned down is allowed to move forwards once again. Because of the 
asynchronous signaling protocols employed, even after a wavefront is pinned down at one location 
(for example at 01), it can still move ahead at other fronts. In other words, the wavefront can warp 
till it is about to encroach into “forbidden regions” . So, for example, the portion of the wavefront 
at location 10 can move to 20 and 30 even after being pinned down at 01.
4.1 Overview of the Results
We specified the wavefront arbiter in SMV and verified the following properties:
• Safety Conditions: “A column cannot be assigned to two rows simultaneously, or a row 
can not be assigned two columns simultaneously.” For example,
AG (c[0] [0] .trapped -> !c[l][0].trapped);
AG (c[0][0].trapped -> !c[0][1].trapped);
• Deadlocks: “No LockC loses the ability to access a column (and similarly, a row).” For 
example,
AG EF c[0][1].trapped;
• Progress: “If lock is asserted, the wave is guaranteed to be eventually trapped.” For example,
AG (c[0][0].11.lock -> AF c[0][0].trapped);
Due to state explosion, the size of the largest array that could be verified was 3x3. An informal 
( “paper and pencil” ) inductive proof of correctness for arbitrary sizes is easy to provide. Carrying 
out induction in the framework of SMV (through the use of a suitable network invariant [1]) is 
presently being looked into.
4.2 Details of the Crossbar Arbiter and its Verification
The wavefront arbiter was specified at the structural level. Each cell contains an XOR gate and a 
LockC gate. Modules such as the LockC can be elegantly specified in SMV owing to its capability 
to describe concurrent processes. For illustration, the description of the LockC is given below.
MODULE LockCCros-in , column-in, out) —  A LockC is specified the say it  is used
—  in the wavefront arbiter
VAR
11 : process lock-lack(a,b,c)
ASSIGI
next(out) :* case
11.lack : out; —  after lack, freeze out
row-in=column-in : row-in; —  o/w, when enabled, fire
1 : out; —  when not enabled, hold
esac;
DEFIIE —  defines when token is trapped
trapped :• lack t  (row-in = column-in) t  (row-in * lout);
FAIR
running
—  EID Lockable- C-Element




ASSIGI —  Locally generate to simulate the PE(i) requests.
init(lock) := 0;
init(lack) := 0;
next(lack) := lock; —  arbitrary delay between lock and lack is achieved
—  due to the use of the variable ’running’
next(lock) := case
(a=b) k (a=!c) t lack : 0; —  unlock after token trapped




—  EID MODULE




of a one-input 
lockc, the X N O R  
gate that detects 
that a token has 
been trapped, 
and the O R  gate 
that generates 
the acknowledge.
The input to 
l+x+o is the lock 
signal and the 
output is the 
ack signal.
Figure 4: Crisscrossing One Dimensional Arbiters
4.3 Discussions
The state space of the wavefront arbiter grows exponentially with the array size, as the cells of the 
arbiter can be in all possible combinations of their states. This was observed in our inability to 
verify arbiters of sizes higher than 3x3. Application of induction techniques to the arbiter circuit 
ended to be not so straightforward as the examples dealt with in [1]. The main idea used in [1] is 
to identify a network invariant and then to design a generic module that can simulate an arbitrary 
number of the modules in the original design. This approach is straightforward to apply when 
the design consists of entities such as a single shared global bus on which an arbitrary number of 
components can be replicated. In that case, a cut-point on the bus can be identified and a generic 
module representing an arbitrary number of modules connected to a shared bus can be plugged in 
at the cut-point. The number of inputs and outputs of the generic module do not depend on the 
size of the arbitrary-sized array being modeled by it.
Unfortunately, in case of arbiter, each of the cells takes one input from its top neighbor and 
another input from its left neighbor. A generic module that represents “the remainder of the 
wavefront arbiter array” does not have a fixed number of inputs. Induction can still be carried out 
in the two dimensions separately. However, in that case, the behavior of a row-slice or a column-size 
is not quite as intuitive.
The wavefront arbiter presented in Figure 3 is inefficient in one respect. When a wavefront is 
trapped at location i , j , location * +  l , j  +  1 cannot make any connections, even though it does not 
share a row- or column with i , j .  This disadvantage is overcome by another arbiter designed by us, 
called the “crisscrossing one-dimensional arbiters” (Figure 4). This circuit has also been verified 
using SMV.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the long run, SMV must be interfaced to design systems. As a preliminary step in that direc­
tion, we have developed a graphical interface to SMV using which Petri-nets can be drawn and 
automatically compile into SMV descriptions. We are sure that this tool called Petriland (which
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was developed by Jim St.Germain, a student of the Program Verification class taught by the first 
author) will greatly simplify the encoding of designs.
The present implementation of SMV is not very much oriented towards specifying systems 
with shared writable variables (that can be written from multiple places). Due to its emphasis on 
compositional specifications, the SMV system requires the programmer to explicitly indicate every 
shared writable variable update, even if the update is merely to hold the same value across one 
time-step. This makes the modeling of many protocols notationally very tedious. A tool such as 
Petriland can again help here because it generates SMV code that uses only TRANS assertions to 
directly specify the state transitions underlying the Petri-net being modeled.
The circuits used to realize our crossbar arbiters require certain one-sided timing constraints to 
be obeyed in their implementation. Although these timing constraints can be encoded in SMV, we 
believe that other formalisms (e.g., [10, 11, 12]) may be more suitable for this level of verification.
In conclusion, we are pleased with how SMV has fared in our hardware and software verification 
experiments. Coding styles that will prevent state explosion from occurring must be developed and 
discussed. The SMV system must also provide insight to the user on the source of state explosion 
and provide better insight into its operation.
The examples discussed in this paper, a few other examples (including the description and 
validation of the Cache Coherence protocol obeyed by the Alpha Demonstration Unit [13] written 
by Yarden Livnat), and the code of Petriland are available upon request from ganesh@cs.utah.edu. 
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